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General Assembly
Fifty-ninth session
Items 57, 100 and 152 of the preliminary list*

Security Council
Fifty-ninth year

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

International drug control

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Letter dated 1 July 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the following Permanent Missions of States Members of the United Nations, which are also members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan, I have the honour, as a representative of the host country of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, to convey to you the text of the Tashkent Declaration of Heads of Shanghai Cooperation Organization States, adopted at their summit on 17 June 2004 (see annex).

The declaration expresses the common aspiration of the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to make joint efforts to counter new threats and challenges, including terrorism and illicit drug trafficking, and to foster cooperation in different areas, mainly in the economic sphere.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the Tashkent Declaration circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under items 57, 100 and 152 of the preliminary list, and also of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alisher **Vohidov**
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uzbekistan
to the United Nations

* A/59/50 and Corr.1.

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Annex to the letter dated 1 July 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Tashkent Declaration by the heads of State of the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

[Original: Russian]

The heads of State of the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (hereinafter "SCO" or "the Organization") — the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan — at a meeting in Tashkent of the Council of Heads of State of the Members of SCO held on 17 June 2004, declare the following:

I

The heads of State emphasized that the success achieved by SCO since its inception and the changes in the international situation bear witness to the appropriateness of the institutions and development of the Organization to the trend of the times and to the long-term, fundamental interests of the peoples of the six States, as well as to the correctness of the principles established by the Organization.

The heads of State, noting the successful accomplishment of the tasks of completing the organizational establishment of SCO, outlined at the Moscow summit in May 2003, made a favourable assessment of the work carried out by the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Council of National Coordinators.

The heads of State expressed their satisfaction at the timely launch of the standing organs of SCO — the Secretariat in Beijing and the Executive Committee of the Regional Counter-Terrorist Structure in Tashkent and noted the major efforts made by the Chinese and Uzbek parties to create appropriate conditions for their full operation.

In October 2003 the leading organ of the Regional Counter-Terrorist Structure, the Council, began its work. Within the Regional Counter-Terrorist Structure a concrete plan of work was developed and a number of essential legislative instruments were adopted. The essential preconditions were thus in place for the effective functioning of the Structure which has the task of ensuring systemic and focused cooperation, within the framework of SCO, to implement the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism.

Note was taken of the importance of the uninterrupted operation of the mechanism for funding the activities of SCO to the high-quality and effective resolution of the problems facing the Organization.

The long-term programme of multilateral trade and economic cooperation between the SCO member States adopted by the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) in Beijing in September 2003 is of vital importance for the strengthening of SCO as a whole and for the development of its economic component. The document not only enshrined a general understanding of the

guidelines, objectives and tasks of the working partnership among the six countries up to the year 2020 but also outlined the ways and means of achieving them.

The Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs is hard at work. The Protocol on collaboration and the coordination of activity between the ministries of foreign affairs of the six countries has an important role to play in harmonizing the positions of the six countries on current issues in international life.

The heads of State support the initiative of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the holding of regular meetings of the Secretaries of the Security Councils of the member States of the Organization in order to strengthen collaboration among the appropriate national bodies in meeting new threats and challenges.

The heads of State emphasize that, under the new conditions, the Council of National Coordinators, with the support of the SCO Secretariat, must concentrate not only on ensuring the smooth operation of SCO but also on developing conceptual approaches to the further development of the Organization.

Ever since the phase of its inception, SCO, following the principle of openness, has taken part in international relations as an authoritative and equal partner. SCO will continue to do so in the future. A new substantive step in the establishment and broadening of contacts between the Organization and other international groupings and States, irrespective of their geographical location, were the guidelines on observer status in ISC adopted in Tashkent. Work will continue on the documents regulating other forms of international collaboration by SCO as envisaged by the Charter of the Organization.

II

At the close of the period of institutional establishment, SCO embarked on the phase of the development of full scale collaboration by the member States in the framework of the Organization. The heads of State support a gradual and well ordered advance along all the lines defined in the SCO Charter. In that context, cooperation must have both long-term objectives and priorities for the immediate future. The purpose of cooperation is the joint definition of the interests uniting the six countries on the basis of respect for their uniqueness and sovereign rights.

The Agreement on Cooperation against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Their Precursors, signed in Tashkent, will be of great importance to multilateral efforts in the framework of SCO to confront transnational threats and challenges. The heads of State consider that the progress of implementation of that Agreement should be within the purview of the machinery for meetings of the Secretaries of the Security Councils which might also organize work on the drafting of a multidisciplinary programme document on cooperation in the framework of SCO to address new challenges and threats, including the illicit traffic in weapons, munitions, and explosive, toxic, poisonous and radioactive substances, and mercenarism.

The key to the stability and security of the Central Asian region and of co-terminous States is their steady economic development and satisfying the urgent vital needs of their population.

In that connection, the heads of State deem it essential that, by the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) in Bishkek in

autumn 2004, agreement should be reached on the plan for measures to implement the above-mentioned programme of multilateral trade and economic collaboration and that the four groups of experts that have been established should be finalized. It is important to envisage such systemic steps, the implementation of which implies embarking on modern forms of trade and economic collaboration and the expansion of commodity circulation between our countries, the harmonization of the regulatory and legal framework, and the gradual creation of favourable conditions for the free circulation of goods, capital, services and technologies.

In addition to measures already taken or planned to stimulate the processes of integration in the framework of SCO, the heads of State consider it opportune to embark on the creation of an SCO Development Fund and an SCO Business Council and instruct the SCO secretariat to ensure, in the shortest possible time, the preparation of the appropriate documents to give effect to those projects.

On the whole, while assessing positively the development of cooperation in various areas in the period following the Moscow summit, the heads of State draw attention to the vital necessity of ensuring clarity and effectiveness in cooperation between ministries responsible for foreign economic activity and foreign trade, transport, defence, culture, dealing with the aftermath of emergency situations, and also between other structures of the SCO member States.

At the same time, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the work of the institution of meetings of the heads of ministries and departments, particular importance attaches to the prompt completion of the drafting and adoption of legal standards for cooperation, as well as the timely implementation of agreements reached.

It is essential to incorporate environmental protection issues, and the rational and effective utilization of water resources, in the agenda for the development of cooperation in the framework of the Organization. The corresponding ministries and departments, together with scientific establishments, might make a start as early as the current year on joint work to prepare a strategy for SCO in those areas.

III

The heads of State are convinced that the steady development and strengthening of SCO, as an organization that does not form a bloc and is based on the principles of equal partnership, mutual respect, trust and openness, are consistent with the major lines of international development and will promote a broadening of the framework of international dialogue.

SCO is ready to play an active part in the constructive formation of a new security architecture capable of consolidating broad international efforts to respond to the new challenges and threats facing global and regional stability. To that end, SCO will cooperate with other States and international structures, chief among them the United Nations, and make its contribution to security and stability not just in its own area but in the world as a whole.

The heads of State express great concern in connection with the recent sharp upsurge of terrorism and extremism. Terrorists are targeting various countries and regions of the world. Terrorism adapts flexibly to the situation, adopts modern technology and is willing to make use of any unregulated conflicts for its own purposes.

The global threat of terrorism must be opposed by the global system of counter-terrorism, with the United Nations at its core, which must be based on regional, subregional and national structures. At the same time it is important not only to respond adequately to the actions of terrorists but also to endeavour to pre-empt them.

The SCO member States will strengthen their collaboration in the field of security in order to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism and to protect their common interests. The heads of State note the expediency of conducting joint counter-terrorism training with the participation of the law enforcement agencies and special services, aimed at strengthening coordination in the fight against such threats.

The heads of State consider that the responses to the complex challenges of modern times — whether international terrorism or regional conflicts and crises — can and must be found on a multilateral and cooperative basis without dividing states into different categories and in keeping with the standards and principles of international law. Only such an approach will ensure international security and stability in the conditions of globalization. SCO firmly resolves to be guided in its activity by those principles and expresses its willingness to cooperate actively with all States and multilateral groupings on that conceptual basis.

SCO, which is committed to the emergence of a peaceful, united and flourishing Afghanistan living in harmony with its neighbours and with other countries of the world, welcomes the formation in that country of a widely representative government.

The SCO member States, acknowledging the central coordinating role of the United Nations in the implementation of international programmes in that country will strive to promote international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking in order to establish security, peace and tranquillity as well as to create the essential conditions for the peaceful renewal of Afghanistan.

IV

The heads of State note that the constructive cooperation of all regional groupings in the Asia-Pacific region is of defining importance for the support of peace, stability and prosperity in which all countries in the region undoubtedly have an interest.

The heads of State propose to all the international organizations and forums active in the Asia-Pacific region that they should make a start on the gradual establishment of a partnership network of multilateral entities by concluding among themselves the appropriate agreements, including the granting to one another, on a reciprocal basis, of observer status.

The heads of State consider that the realization of that initiative would promote the formation in the Asia-Pacific region of a cooperative system of overall regional security and cooperation acting in the framework of the United Nations Charter and of international law and taking account, on an equal basis, of the interests of all participants.

Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China

N. A. Nazarbayev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

A. A. Akayev, President of the Kyrgyz Republic

V. V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation

E. S. Rakhmonov, President of the Republic of Tajikistan

I. A. Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

Tashkent, 17 July 2004

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Fifty-ninth session
Item 145 of the preliminary list*
Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

Eleven States submitted reports, pursuant to paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 57/15, by the established deadline (see section II of the report);

Two views were received from States pursuant to paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 57/15 (see section III of the report);

Thirty-two additional States became participants to the instruments relevant to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives (see section IV of the report), since the previous report (A/57/99) on the topic.

* A/59/50 and Corr.1.

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I. Introduction

1. On 19 November 2002, the General Assembly adopted resolution 57/15, entitled "Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives". Paragraphs 10 to 13 of the resolution read as follows:

"*The General Assembly*,

"10. *Requests*:

(*a*) All States to report to the Secretary-General as promptly as possible serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations;

(*b*) The State in which the violation occurred — and, to the extent possible, the State where the alleged offender is present — to report to the Secretary-General as promptly as possible on measures taken to bring the offender to justice and eventually to communicate, in accordance with its laws, the final outcome of the proceedings against the offender, and to report on measures adopted with a view to preventing a repetition of such violations;

(*c*) The States so reporting to consider using or taking into account the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General;[2]

"11. *Requests* the Secretary-General:

(*a*) To send, without delay, a circular note to all States reminding them of the request contained in paragraph 10 above;

(*b*) To circulate to all States, upon receipt, the reports received by him pursuant to paragraph 10 above, unless the reporting State requests otherwise;

(*c*) To draw the attention, when appropriate, of the States directly concerned to the reporting procedures provided for in paragraph 10 above, when a serious violation has been reported pursuant to paragraph 10 (*a*) above;

(*d*) To address reminders to States where such violations have occurred if reports pursuant to paragraph 10 (*a*) above or follow-up reports pursuant to paragraph 10 (*b*) above have not been made within a reasonable period of time;

"12. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to invite States, in the circular note referred to in paragraph 11 (*a*) above, to inform him of their views with respect to any measures needed or already taken to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations;

"13. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session a report containing:

(*a*) Information on the state of ratification of, and accessions to, the instruments referred to in paragraph 8 above;

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[2] A/42/485, annex.

(*b*) A summary of the reports received and views expressed pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above;"

2. By a note dated 12 December 2002, the Secretary-General drew the attention of States to the request contained in paragraph 10 (a) of General Assembly resolution 57/15 and invited them to report to the Secretary-General serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives.

3. The present report is prepared pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 57/15.

4. Section II of the report contains a summary of the reports received and the text of those reports.

5. Section III of the report contains the views expressed pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 57/15.

6. Section IV of the report contains information on the status of participation of States, as at 2 June 2004, in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961[1] and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963,[2] and the respective optional protocols thereto, as well as the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.[3]

II. Reports received from States pursuant to paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 57/15

7. The report by **Burkina Faso**, containing communications dated 26 and 31 January 2003, referred to violations involving the premises of its diplomatic and consular missions and violence directed at their personnel and property in Côte d'Ivoire. The relevant part of the report reads as follows:

"Well before 19 September 2002, when the current inter-Ivorian crisis broke out, and especially after that date, the premises of the diplomatic missions and consulates of Burkina Faso in Bouaké, Abidjan and Soubré were repeatedly subject to forced entry and assault.

"Diplomatic and consular personnel in those cities were also the victims of physical and psychological violence.

"Despite the impunity surrounding these violations of international law committed in broad daylight, Burkina Faso refrained from any action that might have placed the people of Côte d'Ivoire in a difficult position and chose instead to work at the regional, subregional and bilateral levels for a rapid return to peace in Côte d'Ivoire.

"It is therefore both with regret and out of a desire to contribute to the effective implementation of the relevant provisions of United Nations instruments, such as General Assembly resolution 57/15 of 19 November 2002, that this information is being transmitted to the Secretary-General. A note of protest was also sent to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire on 26 January 2003.

Communiqué from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation

"During the night of 25-26 January 2003, demonstrators opposed to the presence of foreigners in Côte d'Ivoire ransacked and set fire to the premises of the Consulate General of Burkina Faso in Abidjan and the Honorary Consulate of Burkina Faso in Soubré.

"Vehicles and documents were burned and considerable sums of money were taken.

"Burkina Faso strongly condemns these events, which constitute a serious dereliction by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire of its duty to protect consular premises in Burkina Faso pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

"These events are all the more unacceptable in that such violations of our diplomatic and consular premises had been occurring since the beginning of the Ivorian crisis.

"Burkina Faso condemns these vile acts and demands that they should be brought fully to light and that those responsible should be found and brought to justice.

"It demands that adequate measures should be taken immediately in order to put an end to such acts and prevent their recurrence.

"Burkina Faso, which has always shown itself willing to contribute to the search for peace in Côte d'Ivoire, reaffirms its support for the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, France and the international community to find appropriate solutions to the Ivorian crisis.

"In that connection, it welcomes the outcome of the Conference of Heads of State on Côte d'Ivoire, held in Paris on 25 and 26 January 2003, and it endorses the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, the implementation of which should restore peace in Côte d'Ivoire."

8. **Germany** submitted a report, dated 20 February 2003, regarding the incident that occurred on 12 December 2002 involving the premises of the German Ambassador's residence in Harare. The relevant part of the report reads as follows:

"In the evening of 12 December 2002 five members of the Zimbabwean police, military and — it is assumed — secret service penetrated the premises of the German Ambassador's residence in Harare. At approximately 8.30 p.m. a vehicle of the Zimbabwean police with five passengers aboard passed the gate to the residence with no objection by the Zimbabwean police officer on duty. Of the five men, two wore police uniforms and another the uniform of the presidential guard. Two others were dressed as civilians; they are believed to be members of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) of Zimbabwe. The intruders drove to the parking lot of the residence and interrogated the drivers present there with regard to the dinner being given at that time by the German Ambassador. He was not informed of the events until much later that evening. The intruders initially claimed to be invited guests but later admitted that they

were not. After questioning the drivers for a while and after having taken note of their personal data, the five men left.

"As this action by Zimbabwean authorities clearly constitutes a breach of article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Germany as well as the European Union (EU) Presidency immediately protested to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Harare by means of notes verbales. Moreover, the EU Troika in Harare undertook a démarche with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Harare on 22 January 2003 expressing the serious concern of the EU at this grave breach of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and demanding the immediate assurance of the Government of Zimbabwe that in the future it would act in strict compliance with the Vienna Convention. The EU requested that the matter be cleared up urgently.

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Harare, represented by the Political Director and Divisional Head for Europe and the Americas, explained to the EU Troika that the investigations concerning the incident were still going on and had not yet been concluded. On the same occasion, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also formally expressed its regret and gave assurance of its commitment to the principles of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations."

9. The State of **Kuwait** submitted a report, dated 9 April 2003, regarding the incidents involving its embassy that occurred on 23 March 2003 in Tripoli and on 21 March 2003 in Beirut. The relevant part of the report reads as follows:

"1. At 4.15 p.m. on Sunday, 23 March 2003, a demonstration took place in front of the Embassy of the State of Kuwait in the Libyan capital, Tripoli. The Embassy was stormed by demonstrators, who subsequently committed acts of sabotage that extended to the Embassy building and resulted in material and financial losses, as follows:

(a) *Material losses*

- All of the 16 wooden doors were broken;
- Most of the windows were broken by stones;
- The Embassy switchboard was damaged;
- All of the three computer terminals were damaged;
- The filing cabinets were broken;
- The desks and desk drawers were broken.

These acts of sabotage were carried out by saboteurs using iron implements.

(b) *Financial losses*

- Theft of approximately US$ 9,000 kept in the charge of the Embassy in a drawer belonging to the Chargé d'affaires;
- Theft of a passport (ordinary) and some personal papers belonging to the Chargé d'affaires.

Notably, the Libyan security forces stationed at the entrance to the Embassy made no effort or attempt to disperse the demonstrators, although the Chargé

d'affaires of the Kuwaiti Embassy urged them strongly, more than once but to no avail, to disperse the crowd as a precautionary measure in order to avert any act of sabotage.

"2. Two demonstrations took place on Friday, 21 March 2003 in front of the Kuwaiti Embassy and the residence of the Ambassador of Kuwait in the capital of Lebanon, Beirut. Demonstrators threw stones at the residence of the Ambassador, breaking some of its glass facades and injuring some security staff."

10. **Mali** submitted a report, dated 25 July 2003, regarding incidents that occurred on 14 and 15 October 2002 involving the residency of its diplomatic representatives in Abidjan. The relevant part of the report reads as follows:

"1. The Government of Mali strongly condemns violations of the residences of diplomatic representatives. Such violations, by heavily armed individuals, occurred during the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire at the residence of the Ambassador of Mali in Abidjan (on the night of 14-15 October 2002) and at the home of the First Counsellor in Abidjan (on 14 October 2002, during the day).

"2. In view of such acts, the Government of Mali believes that the necessary measures should be taken to enhance the protection and security of diplomatic and consular representatives so as to prevent such violations from recurring."

11. In reply to the above-mentioned report by the Republic of Mali, **Côte d'Ivoire** submitted a report, dated 30 January 2004, the relevant part of which reads as follows:

"The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations would like to inform the Secretary-General that the competent authorities have taken up the matter and to assure him that the communications envisaged in paragraph 10 (a) of resolution 57/15 will be sent to him as soon as possible."

12. **Finland** submitted a report, dated 15 May 2004, referring to an incident involving premises owned by the Embassy of Iraq in Helsinki, reported earlier (A/INF/56/6, para. 15). In addition, the same report in its relevant part provided information on incidents in Helsinki involving the Embassies of the Czech Republic and of the Russian Federation, as well as the residence of two diplomatic agents of the Embassy of the United States of America and the storage of the driver of the Embassy of the Republic of Hungary. The relevant part of the report submitted by Finland reads as follows:

"The Permanent Representative of Finland wishes to inform that in relation to the incident on 1 May 2001, reported earlier, in which a group of approximately 50 persons broke into the premises owned by the Embassy of Iraq in Helsinki, the Helsinki District Court sentenced several people in the group to pay fines for interference with possession. The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq did not demand compensation for damage.

"On 14 June 2002, the main entrance of the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Helsinki was attacked by an unknown person. The glass door panel was smashed and other material damage was caused. The attack was also

directed at another property in the neighbourhood. The Helsinki District Court sentenced the offender to pay fines for vandalism and compensation for damage to the Embassy.

"On 21 February 2003, 12 demonstrators who wore "Greenpeace" waistcoats chained themselves to the gates of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Helsinki. The demonstrators were sentenced to pay fines for breach of public peace.

"On 25 February 2003, the residence of two diplomatic agents of the Embassy of the United States of America in Helsinki was intruded into while the occupants were asleep and several items were stolen. There is no evidence of the break-in having been directed purposely at diplomatic personnel. The police are still investigating the case but so far the offender has not been caught.

"On 12 June 2003, two unknown persons intruded into the compound of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Helsinki and urinated in the courtyard. The persons had no evident intention to cause damage to the Embassy or to its staff members. The offenders were sentenced to pay fines for breach of public peace.

"On 6 October 2003, an unknown person intruded into the compound of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Helsinki after raiding a shop nearby. The offender has been summoned to appear in the Helsinki District Court for breach of public peace.

"On 3 December 2003, an unknown person broke into the storage of the driver of the Embassy of the Republic of Hungary in Helsinki and stole several bottles of alcohol. The police are still investigating the break-in but so far the offender has not been caught.

"The Finnish authorities wish to assure the Secretary-General that they take very seriously their duty to take all appropriate action to protect the premises of diplomatic missions against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any attack on the person of the staff members of the missions."

13. The **United Arab Emirates**, **Qatar**, **Lebanon**, **Slovenia** and **Mexico** reported that there had been no violations during the reporting period.

III. Views expressed by States pursuant to paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 57/15

14. In its report, dated 3 March 2003, the **United Arab Emirates** reiterated "the importance of compliance with the principle of reciprocity among the Member States in providing an equal level of protection to the diplomatic and consular missions and representatives of other countries".

15. In its report, dated 25 July 2003, **Mali** noted the following:

"In the context of enhancing the protection and security of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental

organizations, all receiving States should make available free of charge, at the request of missions, security guards to be posted at offices and residences."

IV. Status of participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as at 2 June 2004[4]

16. Each instrument listed below is represented in tables 1 and 2 by the letter shown on the left in the list.

A. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964, in accordance with article 51);

B. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning Acquisition of Nationality of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964, in accordance with article VI);

C. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964);

D. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967, in accordance with article 77);

E. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning Acquisition of Nationality of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967);

F. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967);

G. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973 (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973; entered into force on 20 February 1977).

Table 1
Total participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Signature, succession to signature						
A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
60	18	29	48	18	38	25
Ratification, accession or succession						
A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
181	50	62	166	39	46	147

Table 2
Status of participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

	Signature, succession to signature							*Ratification, accession or succession*						
State	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
Afghanistan								A						G
Albania	A							A			D			G
Algeria								A			D			G
Andorra								A			D			
Angola								A			D			
Antigua and Barbuda											D			G
Argentina	A	B		D		F		A	B		D			G
Armenia								A			D			G
Australia	A			D			G	A		C	D		F	G
Austria	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Azerbaijan								A			D			G
Bahamas								A		C	D			G
Bahrain								A			D			
Bangladesh								A			D			
Barbados								A			D			G
Belarus	A						G	A			D			G
Belgium	A		C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Belize								A			D			G
Benin				D		F		A			D			G
Bhutan								A			D			G
Bolivia				D				A			D			G
Bosnia and Herzegovina					E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Botswana								A	B	C				G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Brazil	A			D	E			A			D			G
Brunei Darussalam														G
Bulgaria	A						G	A		C	D	E	F	G
Burkina Faso				D		F		A			D		F	G
Burundi								A						G
Cambodia								A	B	C				
Cameroon				D	E	F		A			D			G
Canada	A						G	A			D			G
Cape Verde								A			D			G
Central African Republic	A	B	C	D		F		A	B	C				
Chad								A						
Chile	A			D		F		A			D			G
China								A			D			G
Colombia	A		C	D	E	F		A			D			G
Comoros														G
Congo				D	E	F		A						
Cook Islands														
Costa Rica	A			D				A		C	D			G
Côte d'Ivoire				D		F		A						G
Croatia								A			D			G
Cuba	A			D				A			D			G
Cyprus								A			D			G
Czech Republic								A			D			G
Democratic People's Republic of Korea								A			D			G
Democratic Republic of the Congo	A			D	E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Denmark	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Djibouti								A			D			
Dominica								A			D			
Dominican Republic	A	B	C	D	E	F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ecuador	A		C	D			G	A		C	D			G
Egypt								A	B		D	E		G
El Salvador								A			D			G
Equatorial Guinea								A			D			G
Eritrea								A			D			
Estonia								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ethiopia								A						G
Fiji								A		C	D			
Finland	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
France	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Gabon				D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Gambia														
Georgia								A			D			G
Germany	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ghana	A	B	C	D	E	F		A			D	E		G
Greece	A							A			D			G
Grenada								A			D			G
Guatemala	A						G	A			D			G
Guinea								A	B	C	D			
Guinea-Bissau								A						
Guyana								A			D			
Haiti								A			D			G
Holy See	A			D				A			D			
Honduras								A			D			G
Hungary	A						G	A		C	D		F	G
Iceland							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
India								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Indonesia								A	B		D	E		
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	A	B	C	D				A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Iraq	A	B	C					A	B	C	D	E		G
Ireland	A		C	D		F		A			D			
Israel	A		C	D				A						G
Italy	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Jamaica								A			D			G
Japan	A		C					A		C	D		F	G
Jordan								A			D			G
Kazakhstan								A			D			G
Kenya								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Kiribati								A			D			
Kuwait				D	E	F		A		C	D			G
Kyrgyzstan								A			D			G
Lao People's Democratic Republic								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Latvia								A			D			G
Lebanon	A	B	C	D		F		A			D			G
Lesotho								A			D			
Liberia	A			D	E	F		A			D			G
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya								A	B		D			G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Liechtenstein	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Lithuania								A			D			G
Luxembourg	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	
Madagascar								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Malawi								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Malaysia								A	B	C	D			G
Maldives											D			G
Mali								A			D			G
Malta								A		C	D			G
Marshall Islands								A			D			G
Mauritania								A			D			G
Mauritius								A		C	D		F	G
Mexico	A			D				A			D		F	G
Micronesia (Federated States of)								A			D			
Monaco														G
Mongolia							G	A			D			G
Morocco								A	B		D	E		G
Mozambique								A			D			G
Myanmar								A	B		D			
Namibia								A			D			
Nauru								A						
Nepal								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Netherlands								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
New Zealand	A		C					A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Nicaragua							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Niger				D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Nigeria	A							A			D			
Niue														
Norway	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Oman								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Pakistan	A							A		C	D		F	G
Palau														G
Panama	A			D	E	F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Papua New Guinea								A			D			G
Paraguay							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Peru				D		F		A			D			G
Philippines	A	B	C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Poland	A			D			G	A			D			G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Portugal								A			D			G
Qatar								A			D			G
Republic of Korea	A	B	C					A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Republic of Moldova								A			D			G
Romania	A						G	A			D			G
Russian Federation	A						G	A			D			G
Rwanda							G	A			D			G
Saint Kitts and Nevis														
Saint Lucia								A			D			
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines								A			D			G
Samoa								A			D			
San Marino	A							A						
Sao Tome and Principe								A			D			
Saudi Arabia								A			D			G
Senegal	A	B						A			D	E	F	
Serbia and Montenegro					E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Seychelles								A		C	D		F	G
Sierra Leone								A						G
Singapore														
Slovakia								A		C	D		F	G
Slovenia								A		C	D			G
Solomon Islands														
Somalia								A			D			
South Africa	A							A			D			G
Spain								A			D			G
Sri Lanka	A							A	B	C				G
Sudan								A			D			G
Suriname								A	B	C	D	E	F	
Swaziland								A						G
Sweden	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Switzerland	A		C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Syrian Arab Republic								A	B		D	E		G
Tajikistan								A			D			G
Thailand	A	B						A	B		D	E		
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia								A	B	C	D			G
Timor-Leste								A			D			
Togo								A			D			G
Tonga								A			D			G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Trinidad and Tobago								A			D			G
Tunisia							G	A	B		D	E		G
Turkey								A			D			G
Turkmenistan								A			D			G
Tuvalu								A			D			
Uganda								A						G
Ukraine	A						G	A			D			G
United Arab Emirates								A			D			G
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	A		C	D		F	G	A		C	D		F	G
United Republic of Tanzania	A	B	C					A	B	C	D			
United States of America	A		C	D		F	G	A		C	D		F	G
Uruguay	A			D		F		A			D			G
Uzbekistan								A			D			G
Vanuatu											D			
Venezuela	A			D				A			D			
Viet Nam								A			D			G
Yemen								A			D			G
Zambia								A						
Zimbabwe								A			D			

Notes

[1] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 500, No. 7310, p. 95.

[2] Ibid., vol. 596, No. 8638, p. 261.

[3] General Assembly resolution 3166 (XXVIII), annex.

[4] For detailed information, see http://untreaty.un.org.

United Nations A/59/126

General Assembly

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Fifty-ninth session
Item 51 (a) of the preliminary list*
Oceans and the Law of the Sea

A regular process for the global reporting and assessment of the state of the marine environment, including socio-economic aspects: Global Marine Assessment International Workshop

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted in compliance with paragraph 66 of resolution 58/240. It provides a factual account of the discussions which took place during the Global Marine Assessment (GMA) International Workshop, held in New York from 8 to 11 June 2004. The Workshop was convened in compliance with paragraph 64 (d) of resolution 58/240, by which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to convene, in conjunction with the fifth meeting of the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea (7-11 June 2004), an International Workshop with representatives from all interested parties, to further consider and review draft document A/AC.271/WP.1 on the scope, general framework and outline of GMA, peer review, secretariat, capacity-building and funding, prepared by the Group of Experts convened in compliance with paragraph 64 (a) of the resolution. The GMA International Workshop considered draft document A/AC.271/WP.1, together with comments sent by States, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations, as requested in paragraph 64 (b) of the aforementioned resolution, and contained in documents A/AC.271/WP.2 and Add.1, as well as other comments sent after the deadline for publication. All comments received on the draft document were made available, in extenso, on the web site of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS): www.un.org/depts/los/index.htm.

* A/59/50 and Corr.1.

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I. Introduction

1. The World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 agreed, in paragraph 36 (b) of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation,[1] to "establish by 2004 a regular process under the United Nations for global reporting and assessment of the state of the marine environment, including socio-economic aspects, both current and foreseeable, building on existing regional assessments" (Global Marine Assessment (GMA)). The General Assembly later endorsed this paragraph in paragraph 45 of its resolution 57/141 and requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on modalities for the GMA (A/58/423).

2. In paragraph 64 (a) of its resolution 58/240, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to convene a group of experts comprising representatives of States, including all regional groups, and representatives from intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations, including scientists and policy makers, to produce, including by possibly hiring a consultant, a draft document with details on the scope, general framework and outline of the regular process, peer review, secretariat, capacity-building and funding. The Group of Experts met from 23 to 26 March 2004 and issued a draft report contained in document A/AC.271/WP.1. In compliance with paragraph 64 (b) of the resolution, the report was transmitted by the Secretariat to States and relevant intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, scientific associations, funding mechanisms and other parties, for written comments and for indication of specific issues to be addressed in the first assessment.[2] The comments received are contained in documents A/AC.271/WP.2 and Add.1 and were posted, in extenso, on the web site of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), including the additional comments which were sent after the deadline for publication.

3. Those documents constituted the basis for discussions at the GMA International Workshop, which was convened, in compliance with paragraph 64 (d) of resolution 58/240, to further consider and review draft document A/AC.271/WP.1.

II. GMA International Workshop

4. The GMA International Workshop was held in conjunction with the fifth meeting of the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea from 8 to 11 June 2004. It was chaired by Ambassador Felipe Paolillo of Uruguay and Philip Burgess of Australia.

5. During the Workshop, David Pugh, who chaired the Group of Experts, presented an overview of the work undertaken by the experts in compliance with paragraph 64 (a) of resolution 58/240. He underlined that, in draft document A/AC.271/WP.1, the experts had attempted to outline, in a pragmatic manner, what could be the core of the GMA as they best understood it. Mr. Pugh proceeded to provide some highlights on key points of the document, namely, scope, framework of the GMA, peer review, secretariat, capacity-building and funding.

6. There was wide support for the establishment of the GMA, in accordance with paragraph 36 (b) of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, paragraph 45 of resolution 57/141, and paragraph 64 of resolution 58/240. It was noted that the

Workshop represented the first opportunity for States to discuss the practical implications of the establishment of a global marine assessment process.

7. General agreement was reached during the Workshop on the need to focus on the start-up phase and, in particular, the "Assessment of Assessments", as outlined in the report of the Group of Experts. To facilitate negotiations, the co-chairpersons established an informal open-ended group to meet for informal consultations. John Roberts of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, was designated as the Coordinator of the informal consultations.

III. Informal consultations on the GMA: Coordinator's summary

8. The group met on five occasions. During the discussions, points of convergence and divergence emerged. They are reflected in the draft conclusions annexed to the present report. The text in brackets represents divergent views among States. States were clear that, without agreement on the specific points, there was no agreement to the draft conclusions as a whole.

9. There was general agreement that the point of departure for the establishment of the GMA was the World Summit on Sustainable Development mandate, as contained in paragraph 36 (b) of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and confirmed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 57/141 and 58/240.

Assessment of Assessments

10. The group discussed the "Assessment of Assessments" as the first step in the implementation of the start-up phase. The "Assessment of Assessments" would provide, inter alia, a critical appraisal of existing assessments from a variety of sources; would identify what had worked well; and would help States identify areas where quality data was available and those regions where data or institutional capacity for undertaking marine assessments needed to be improved. The discussions provided an opportunity for States to explore some of the issues raised in the report of the Group of Experts.

Task force

11. Consideration was given to the proposal for establishing a task force as a starting point for launching the "Assessment of Assessments". There was general agreement in favour of including in the task force all the relevant international organizations identified in paragraph 45 of resolution 57/141. States should also be closely associated with the work of the task force. It was emphasized that there should be no duplication. Pending issues were related to operational modalities and, in particular, membership in the task force.

Scope

12. Different views were expressed on the issue of the scope of the GMA as a whole, which had an impact on the issue of the scope of the "Assessment of Assessments".

13. Some delegations drew attention to the importance of the ecosystem approach to management, which, they suggested, meant that the GMA should address holistically all impacts on the oceans. In their view, no sector or activities should be excluded in principle from the scope of either the GMA or the preparatory phase. Other delegations drew attention to the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation mandate, which placed the GMA in the context of sustainable development and therefore also suggested that it should have a comprehensive scope.

14. Other delegations suggested that the scope of the assessment should be decided by countries at the point in the process where it came to be initiated. They stressed the need for prioritization, suggesting that pollution was a key area. Other issues, such as living marine resources, were not a priority and indeed the primary responsibility for dealing with them rested with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

15. Consequently, it was concluded that there was no consensus upon which the preparatory phase of the GMA could be launched.

16. Furthermore, since the Workshop had been unable to review fully the draft document of the Group of Experts and agree on a revised draft document on the establishment of the GMA, it appeared premature to hold an intergovernmental meeting in Reykjavik, in October 2004, as mandated by the General Assembly in paragraph 64 (e) of its resolution 58/240, to finalize and adopt the draft document and thus formally establish the GMA.

IV. Conclusion of the GMA International Workshop

17. The GMA International Workshop took note of the divergent views that existed and decided to transmit to the General Assembly for consideration its report and draft conclusions.

Notes

[1] *Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August to 4 September 2002* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.03.II.A.1 and corrigendum), chap. I, resolution 2, annex.

[2] Correspondence dated 7 and 12 April 2004 was sent by regular mail, fax and/or e-mail to Permanent Missions to the United Nations, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations.

Annex

Draft conclusions of the GMA International Workshop*

1. The GMA International Workshop recommends that the General Assembly invite the Secretary-General to establish a[n] [inter-agency] task force to initiate and coordinate the next stage of preparatory work necessary to establish the formal Global Marine Assessment and inform States Members of the United Nations accordingly.

2. The task force should undertake three tasks necessary for the start-up phase:

(a) It should organize an Assessment of Assessments. The aim should be to:

- Assemble information about scientific assessments (including assessments covering social and economic issues) relevant to the GMA which have already been carried out under the purview of United Nations agencies and global treaty organizations, regional organizations, national Governments and, where appropriate, by other organizations, which are relevant to undertaking a regular global marine assessment
- Make a critical appraisal of those assessments, for example, by comparing methodologies, data sources and coverage, in order to identify, collate and synthesize best practices and to identify what thematic and other gaps and uncertainties exist in current scientific knowledge and assessment processes
- Assess how well those assessments have been communicated to policy makers at the national, regional and global levels;

(b) In the light of that assessment, the task force should consult with Member States of the United Nations and the relevant regional organizations to identify where the technical or scientific capacity to undertake marine assessments needs strengthening;

[The assessment of the state of living marine resources and their management falls outside the scope of the "Assessment of Assessments", unless States agree otherwise. Governments will continue to discuss the issue of its scope and will reach a decision before the GMA is established;]

[The Global Marine Assessment must be comprehensive in scope and include all aspects of the marine environment, including living marine resources and socio-economic aspects;]

(c) The task force should prepare summary information on relevant existing intergovernmental regional organizations and arrangements, and current scientific work [for possible use by States in organizing assessments for their regions].

3. In undertaking its work, the task force should conform to the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly (57/141 and 58/240).

4. The task force should communicate its plans and progress to all States Members of the United Nations on a regular basis and should provide the opportunity for them to comment on and contribute to the development of the work at appropriate points.

[The task force should be assisted by a bureau consisting of "X" Member States representing all regional groups.]

[The task force should include representatives of interested Governments.]

Notes

* Points of disagreement are noted in square brackets; agreement has therefore yet to be reached on the conclusions as a whole.

United Nations A/59/127

General Assembly

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English
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Spanish

Fifty-ninth session
Item 67 (m) of the preliminary list*
General and complete disarmament: confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context

Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/59/50 and Corr.1.

04-41807 (E) 270704 020804

I. Introduction

1. On 8 December 2003, the General Assembly adopted resolution 58/43, entitled "Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context", in which, inter alia, it called upon Member States to refrain from the use or threat of use of force in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and upon Member States that have not already done so to open consultations and dialogue in the regions of tension without preconditions. The Assembly urged States to comply strictly with all bilateral, regional and international agreements, including arms control and disarmament agreements, to which they are party. The Assembly also urged, in the context of confidence-building measures, the maintenance of military balance between the States in the regions of tension consistent with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments and encouraged the promotion of unilateral, bilateral and regional confidence-building measures to avoid conflict and prevent the unintended and accidental outbreak of hostilities. The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States with a view to exploring possibilities of furthering efforts towards confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context, particularly in the regions of tension, and to report on the subject to it at its fifty-ninth session. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request and on the basis of information received from Member States.

2. In this connection, a note verbale dated 18 February 2004 was sent to all Member States requesting their views. The replies received are reproduced in section II below. Any replies received subsequently will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. Replies received from States

China

[Original: Chinese]
[6 May 2004]

1. China believes that the establishment of practical and feasible confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional contexts plays a positive role in maintaining international peace and stability and relaxing regional tensions.

2. China holds that in the process of establishing confidence-building measures, countries should adhere to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. A new security concept centred on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation should be advocated. Actual conditions and special features in different regions should be taken into full consideration. The principles of sovereignty and voluntarism should be fully upheld, and the guideline of tackling the easier issues while shelving the more difficult ones in a step-by-step manner should be pursued conscientiously.

3. China welcomes some constructive steps on confidence-building measures taken by other regions and countries, and believes that, while it is necessary to draw upon the experience of others, it is all the more important to adhere to the principles

of fitting the confidence-building measures into local conditions and seeking common ground while preserving differences.

4. The Government of China has always attached importance to and pushed very hard for promoting confidence-building measures with neighbouring countries. It has actively advocated the conclusion of border treaties or agreements between concerned parties through dialogue on an equal footing and in accordance with the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and refraining from targeting any third country or threatening or harming other countries' security and stability, so as to maintain common security for all parties concerned, as well as regional peace and stability.

5. In 1996 and 1997, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China successively signed the Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field along the Border Areas and the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas.

6. In 1993, China and India signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas. In 1996, the two countries signed the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas.

7. In 2002, China and the ASEAN countries signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, committing themselves to exploring possible means to build confidence on the basis of equality and mutual respect.

8. Within the framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), China submits an Annual Security Outlook every year, and hosted some programmes on confidence-building measures, including the ARF professional training programme on China's security policy, the 1997 session and 2003 session of the Meeting of the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures, and the fourth ARF annual Meeting of the Heads of Defence Colleges/Institutions. China will hold two other ARF confidence-building measure activities, namely a seminar on alternative development and a seminar on enhancing cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues.

9. China has been actively taking part in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia process initiated by Kazakhstan. China supports the conference guideline papers, namely, the "Alma-Ata document" and the "Catalogue of confidence-building measures."

Holy See

[Original: English]
[28 February 2004]

The Holy See has no national report to present on the matter.

Israel

[Original: English]
[1 June 2004]

1. Israel believes that confidence-building measures are an effective and significant instrument for improving relations and promoting good-neighbourliness in the regional and subregional context. Israel is of the view that ideas on how to promote and identify regional confidence-building measures should be first and foremost developed and agreed upon in the relevant regional and subregional context between the regional parties themselves. Confidence-building measures should be presented and negotiated, freely and directly, between the regional parties with a view to reducing tensions and facilitating political dialogue and cooperation. We believe that this sequence should be preserved if confidence-building measures are to fulfil their objective.

2. Moreover, it is clearly apparent that confidence-building measures cannot be imposed by some States or even by the international community. Imposing confidence-building measures would undermine their essential objective, namely the enhancement of security and trust between the regional parties.

3. We believe that introducing ideas regarding regional and subregional confidence-building measures and their formation, initially in the United Nations, in the manner described in the above resolution, is counterproductive and runs counter to the principle that confidence-building measures should be freely agreed upon and negotiated between the regional parties. This would not be conducive to the building of trust and confidence in the regional and subregional context.

4. Israel would therefore encourage States to present ideas for confidence-building measures to their relevant regional counterparts through direct dialogue and exchange of views in the pursuit of the objective of enhancing confidence and reduction of tensions.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[26 May 2004]

Lebanon supports all international confidence-building measures and agreements, the maintenance of military balance, and efforts to combat the unrestrained proliferation of various types of weapons in the region and the world, because of the grave threat it poses at the global, regional and subregional levels. Lebanon also wishes to reaffirm its adherence to international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the principles of the sovereign equality of States and regional integrity. The primary obstacle facing Lebanon in confidence-building at the regional and subregional levels is Israel, which continues to occupy part of Lebanese Arab territory, seeks to deny Palestinians the rights of return proclaimed in General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and carries out daily terrorist acts inside occupied Palestine.

Mexico

[Original: Spanish]
[6 May 2004]

1. Mexico reiterates that the adoption of confidence-building measures between States, particularly if they are applied in a comprehensive manner, can make a significant contribution to the strengthening of peace and security and, therefore, to the creation of appropriate conditions for achieving progress in the promotion, development and adoption of disarmament, arms-control and non-proliferation agreements at the international, regional and subregional levels.

2. Mexico is of the opinion that confidence-building measures which States undertake must be of both a military and non-military nature. Those of a military nature must in turn refer both to conventional weapons and to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

3. Mexico also believes that the adoption of confidence-building measures in a regional or subregional context must take into account the prevailing political, military, economic and social situation in the region and that such measures must be adopted in the initiative and with the agreement of the States of the region concerned. Such agreements must be implemented in good faith.

4. It must be stressed that, while confidence-building measures are no substitute for concrete disarmament measures and cannot replace verification measures, which constitute a fundamental element of arms-limitation and disarmament agreements, they do contribute to the development of a systematic process in which such voluntary, unilateral, even-handed and politically binding measures, by their very nature, create a fertile ground so that these measures can become legally binding in the future.

5. Mexico agrees that confidence-building measures must be established on the basis of the principle of security and without prejudice to national security policies. It also believes that the criteria for and applicability of such measures at the regional and subregional context must take due account of the provisions of paragraph 93 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as the "Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level", developed by the Disarmament Commission.

6. Mexico takes note of the emphasis in General Assembly resolution 58/43 on the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and the need to increase efforts to reduce tensions in those regions with specific problems. In accordance with its peaceful tradition, Mexico will continue to promote dialogue as well as the application and development of international law.

7. With regard to the renunciation of the use of force for the settlement of disputes, Mexico promotes, through the principles of its foreign policy, the prohibition of the threat or use of force and favours compliance with and implementation of the international legal framework as the appropriate instrument for guaranteeing international peace and security.

8. In relation to paragraph 4 of the resolution, concerning compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements, the Government of Mexico is of the opinion

that the adoption of such instruments is a sovereign decision taken by each State, pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which establishes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.

9. As for transparency in the acquisition, development and deployment of conventional and strategic weapons, Mexico complies with measures in that regard and annually submits information to the United Nations and the Organization of American States for the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures, respectively. Mexico reaffirms that the ultimate objective of confidence-building measures is to strengthen international peace and security and to contribute to the prevention of war of any kind and nuclear war in particular.

Nicaragua

[Original: Spanish]
[3 June 2004]

1. On 4 May 2004, the Government of Nicaragua began destroying man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) in compliance with Presidential Decree No. 027-2004, which orders and authorizes the gradual destruction of portable anti-aircraft rockets on the basis of the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America and other international agreements concluded by Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan National Assembly issued a resolution of support for the decision of the President of the Republic (Legislative Resolution No. 007-2004).

2. The first group of objects destroyed consisted of 333 portable anti-aircraft rockets of the 9M32M type (MANPADS), four rocket launch tubes and 333 thermal power sources. In July, as a continuation of this first stage, the Nicaraguan army plans to destroy another 333 ground-to-air rockets. This is all within the framework of an appropriate balance of power in Central America.

3. This initiative, encouraged by President Enrique Bolaños, is designed to guarantee security in the Central American region, implement an appropriate balance of power and contribute to hemispheric security and hence international security.

Panama

[Original: Spanish]
[24 May 2004]

1. The Republic of Panama recognizes the need to hold consultations and dialogue with a view to achieving progress in the search for stability in the regions of tension. Panama thus deems it important that States comply with all bilateral, regional and international agreements to which they are party, including arms-control and disarmament agreements.

2. In this connection, Panama recommends the adoption of a proposal to establish a reasonable military balance between States, and participation in the United Nations System for the Standardized Reporting of Military Expenditures as a confidence-building measure at the regional level. Panama believes that the

development and realization of communication between neighbouring civil or military authorities in accordance with their border situations, as well as the identification and development of activities to promote cooperation between them, should act as a measure to avoid conflict and prevent the unintended and accidental outbreak of hostilities.

3. Lastly, Panama believes that the experience gained in connection with the implementation of the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America as a confidence-building measure at the subregional level can serve as a model for other regions and subregions at the global level.

4. The Republic of Panama is convinced that such measures will help to build confidence in the regional and subregional context.

Philippines
(on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations)

[Original: English]
[1 June 2004]

Follow-up action for the realization of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea

Background

1. Regional peace and stability in the South China Sea is an issue of common interest to the ASEAN member States and China. Various efforts have been undertaken to promote peace and stability in the South China Sea including the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea hosted by Indonesia since 1990, a Track II forum aimed at bringing about the eventual transformation of the South China Sea from an arena of potential conflict into a venue for actual and mutually beneficial cooperation. This was followed by the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea issued on 22 July 1992 in Manila. The most recent is the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which was signed on 4 November 2002 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

2. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea is the first political document jointly issued by ASEAN and China on the South China Sea issue. It reflects the commitment of all sides to seek ways for building trust and confidence in order to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the South China Sea for the enhancement of peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity of the region based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea of 1982, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and other universally recognized principles of international law.

3. In line with the provision of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea which states that pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes the parties concerned undertake to seek ways to build trust and confidence between and among them, China and ASEAN agreed to undertake cooperative activities and that the modalities, scope and locations, in respect of

bilateral and multilateral cooperation, would be agreed upon by the parties concerned prior to their actual implementation.

4. In this context, the ASEAN Senior Officials' Meeting, held from 26 to 28 August 2003 in Surabaya, agreed that the Track one symposium proposed by the People's Republic of China should be held in Indonesia, as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee. Indonesia agreed to host this symposium in early 2004.

5. The ASEAN claimant States met in Putrajaya on 6 April 2004 to discuss in detail the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.

6. The claimant States reiterated their commitment to the full and timely implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and agreed on the need to discuss specific measures for its realization in a forum that will reflect its importance. They agreed to propose the convening of an ASEAN-China Senior Officials' Meeting, which will review the current political situation in the South China Sea, review current bilateral and multilateral cooperative mechanisms, and identify specific ways and means to concretely implement the Declaration.

7. The claimant States agreed to take the following course of action:

Step 1

- The ASEAN claimant States would convey their agreement on the course of action formally to the rest of the ASEAN members. It was noted that an occasion to do that would be during the ASEAN Senior Officials' Meeting on the ASEAN Security Community, to be held in Indonesia.

Step 2

- ASEAN would convey its common position to China during the ASEAN-China Senior Officials' Consultations.
- An ASEAN-China Senior Officials' Meeting on the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea would be convened with the consent of ASEAN and China.
- The ASEAN-China Senior Officials' Meeting on the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea will assess the current political situation in the South China Sea and mandate the creation of an ASEAN-China working group to draw up guidelines for the implementation of the Declaration, which would move the process further towards the adoption of a regional code of conduct in the South China Sea.
- The ASEAN-China Senior Officials' Meeting would draw up the terms of reference for the joint working group and the symposium.
- Additional expert groups could be created to look into specific issues, as necessary.

Step 3

- Convening of the ASEAN-China symposium, at the level of Track 1.5, involving government officials from ASEAN and China, think tanks and academia.
- The symposium would be convened in an ASEAN country on a date to be mutually agreed by ASEAN and China.
- Follow-up symposia could be held as and when necessary.

8. Among the topics to be considered by the symposium would be:

- An assessment of the situation and inventory of existing bilateral/multilateral activities in the South China Sea.
- Humane treatment of all persons in danger or in distress.
- Safety of navigation and communication at sea.
- Joint training in maritime search and rescue operations.

Conclusion

9. The follow-up action outlined above is envisaged as a process leading to the eventual realization of the regional code of conduct.

Confidence-building measures in the Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines-East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA)

Customs, immigration, quarantine and security initiatives

10. The differing customs, immigration, quarantine and security rules, regulations and procedures of the BIMP-EAGA member countries have posed various constraints on the growth area's ability to generate productive economic activity. This apparent lack of coordination between the concerned agencies has also hampered the subregion's efforts to curb transnational crime due to differing standards of policy and implementation.

11. The recommendation for customs, immigration, quarantine and security harmonization was first broached by the Philippines during the 5th BIMP-EAGA Senior Officials' Meeting held from 4 to 6 July 1996 in Davao City. In July 1999, the Bureau of Immigration offered to host a customs, immigration, quarantine and security conference during the 9th Senior Officials' Meeting/7th Ministerial Meeting in Labuan, Malaysia.

12. In October 2000, the Bureau of Immigration and the Mindanao Economic Development Council conducted the first Mindanao-Palawan Customs, Immigration, Quarantine and Security Workshop in Davao City, Philippines. The Mindanao-Palawan Customs, Immigration, Quarantine and Security Task Force was formed at that meeting.

The Philippine customs, immigration, quarantine and security primer

13. Prior to the envisioned EAGA-wide harmonization, steps must first be undertaken to harmonize and streamline customs, immigration, quarantine and security rules and regulations at the Philippine-EAGA level. The first Philippine

primer on customs, immigration, quarantine and security was drafted by the Mindanao Economic Development Council secretariat, in cooperation with the Bureau of Immigration, in August 2000. The primer aims to provide the business sector in the Philippines, as well as the private sector and government counterparts in Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia and Malaysia with a complete reference listing of all Philippine customs, immigration, quarantine and security rules, regulations and procedures to be followed in conducting trade and other business-related activities in BIMP-EAGA.

The Zamboanga-Sandakan, General Santos-Bitung and Davao-Manado Bilateral Customs, Immigration, Quarantine and Security Workshops

14. The Zamboanga-Sandakan Bilateral Customs, Immigration, Quarantine and Security Workshop was held in Zamboanga City on 8 January 2004 and the General Santos-Bitung/Davao-Manado Workshop was held in General Santos City on 14 January 2004. These workshops between the BIMP-EAGA customs, immigration, quarantine and security agencies discussed issues of border security and identified possible opportunities for cooperation and specific arrangements that will streamline and harmonize the existing customs, immigration, quarantine and security procedures, rules and regulations on a port-to-port basis.

The first BIMP-EAGA Security Officials' Workshop, 29 January 2004, Davao City

15. The Philippine hosting of the first BIMP-EAGA Security Officials' Workshop in Davao City on 29 January 2004 was the culminating activity of the three bilateral customs, immigration, quarantine and security meetings, during which special focus was given to security concerns within the subregion. The objectives of the one-day workshop were as follows:

(i) To increase the participation of security officials utilizing existing BIMP-EAGA structures and networking to enhance border security and create an opportunity for the delegates to meet their respective counterparts;

(ii) To identify common problems/issues affecting security within the subregion;

(iii) To identify opportunities for cooperation among the member countries, in order to formulate specific arrangements that will streamline existing security rules, regulations and procedures in each member country;

(iv) To intensify efforts on information exchange and dissemination to prevent the movement of terrorists and criminal elements; and

(v) To establish person-to-person or port-to-port contacts between the BIMP-EAGA security officials for direct access and easy communication.

16. The following are the highlights of the discussions of the working groups on land, aviation and maritime security:

(a) Land security. To regulate the movement of migrants, there is a need for information dissemination on trans-border rules, regulations and procedures. To reduce and prevent the commission of transnational crimes (piracy, kidnapping for ransom, smuggling and other terrorist activities) member countries must establish an

intelligence network and exchange information. A working group on intelligence and the establishment of a secured web site were proposed.

(b) Maritime security. There are poor communication linkages between law enforcement agencies. The threats on ships, port facilities and the environment can be reduced or prevented through implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and the Code of Practice on Security in Ports. The exchange of information on the implementation of EAGA members and bilateral arrangements are important. Countries should also exchange information on types of transnational border crimes in EAGA.

(c) Aviation security. There is a need to publish security rules, regulations and procedures in the member countries. Countries should also establish communication channels and information exchange, and reporting of procedures in identifying and apprehending undesirable aliens. It was agreed that the BIMP countries would formulate a primer for aviation security procedures and regulations for the subregion. This primer is currently being drafted.

ASEAN-Japan Exchange Year 2003 project
ASEAN-Japan Security Symposium 2003
Tokyo, 9-10 October 2003

17. In celebration of 2003 as the Year of ASEAN-Japan Exchange, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore, convened a symposium in Tokyo on 9 and 10 October 2003 to review the progress of, and prospects for, ASEAN-Japan security cooperation. The symposium brought together senior officials and analysts from the leading institutes of strategic and international studies in ASEAN countries and their Japanese counterparts.

18. ASEAN-Japan security dialogue stands at a critical juncture at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In the 25 years following the establishment of the ASEAN Cultural Fund, a process in which former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda played a key role, ASEAN and Japan established a broad and substantive range of economic and sociocultural relations within the political and security framework of the cold war period. The Asia-Pacific region now confronts a new geopolitical environment in the post-cold war and post-11 September period. There is a need to review the increasing multifaceted interfaces between ASEAN-Japan relations and the new and complex geopolitical environment.

19. The symposium identified a number of political and security challenges for ASEAN-Japan cooperation. These include:

Counter-terrorism measures;

Export controls and transnational crimes;

Military modernization and weapons of mass destruction;

Maritime security;

Peacekeeping operations (including joint training and exercises);

Regional security frameworks.

20. The above list of issues, symposium participants stressed, is not exhaustive, as there may be other critical issues that deserve attention, such as aviation security.

21. These are complex issues that require more studies to be conducted by senior officials from both ASEAN and Japan. Symposium participants therefore recommended that the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit in December 2003 designate a Senior Officials' Meeting to study more systematically how these changes in the region's geopolitical environment impact ASEAN-Japan relations and to recommend proposals on how ASEAN and Japan can more effectively cooperate in order to meet these new geopolitical challenges.

22. Symposium participants also recommended that a Track II network of officials (acting in their private capacities) and representatives of strategic and international studies institutions be established to support the deliberations of the Senior Officials' Meeting. The symposium nominated JIIA and IDSS to offer their services to their Governments, and to convene in 2004 a team of experts from Japan and ASEAN to further study and recommend measures to be adopted by Japan and ASEAN so as to better manage the new political realities and security challenges of the twenty-first century. Symposium participants recommended that their ministers consider drawing funds from existing Japan-ASEAN funds to support JIIA and IDSS in convening two workshops (one in Tokyo and the other in Singapore), leading to a second symposium in Singapore that will draw up a report and a series of recommendations for consideration by the heads of government when they meet again.

Poland

[Original: English]
[7 May 2004]

1. Poland is deeply committed to the United Nations idea of promoting agreements to strengthen regional peace and security. We welcome resolution 58/43, adopted by the General Assembly on 8 December 2003, as an important contribution to international peace and security. We hope that Member States will strengthen their efforts to bring about closer cooperation in the field of confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context.

2. Polish policy on conventional arms control plays an important role in the security policy at the regional and subregional levels. Poland is a party to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Treaty on Open Skies and is a participating State in other conventional arms-control agreements concluded within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including the Vienna Document 1999, which still remains the base of the confidence-building measures system in Europe. Being also a member of the European Union (EU) the Republic of Poland is going to meet its obligations in the area of common foreign and security policy, such as the EU programme for preventing and combating illicit trafficking in conventional arms and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. All the above-mentioned agreements and initiatives constitute an essential element of cooperative European security and will continue to remain an important tool for strengthening security as long as military security risk exists, although they may be different in nature and scope from those of the past.

3. We believe that the Member States should undertake all necessary measures to increase transparency and confidence and to ensure that overall objectives of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation remain in harmony. The efforts we have been making so far must be intensified. We consider confidence-building, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation as important components of conflict prevention and recognize that the United Nations is designed to play a crucial role in this field by promoting broader, more comprehensive cooperation and dialogue at both the regional and subregional levels. A good example of successful cooperation at the subregional level is an "Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on complementary confidence- and security-building measures" signed on 16 April 2004. It has the aim of enhancing confidence, security and good-neighbourly relations between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine.

4. Poland with its positive experience of the results of the implementation of the European conventional arms and control regime, strongly encourages other Member States that have not already done so to begin negotiations on these kinds of agreements. We are also convinced that strengthening and expansion of regional and subregional cooperation and the implementation of the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements to which they are parties will contribute to further strengthening confidence between them, as well as security at the regional and subregional levels and in the United Nations community as a whole. For our part, we are ready to share with interested States our experience gained during the negotiation and implementation of the above-mentioned conventional arms-control agreements.

Qatar

[Original: Arabic]
[4 May 2004]

1. The State of Qatar enjoys good-neighbourly relations with all neighbouring States and is bound to them by shared interests. The State of Qatar has hastened to take prompt and effective action in respect of confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels through its relations with all neighbouring States by means of dialogue, compliance with agreements signed with all regional and international parties and the maintenance of military balance.

2. The State of Qatar is taking effective measures aimed at building confidence between States to avoid conflict and prevent the unintended and accidental outbreak of hostilities between neighbouring States within a regional and international context.

Venezuela

[Original: Spanish]
[18 May 2004]

The Government of Venezuela is in favour of any initiatives aimed at the adoption of confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context, under United Nations auspices. However, the situation of tension or conflict that is

being addressed should be given a precise and detailed evaluation in order that efforts towards the prevention or peaceful settlement of disputes will meet with the parties' approval. Although it is true that a consensus exists concerning the overarching need for peace as a prerequisite for development, the complexities of each situation of tension or conflict are the result of States' traditionally opposing conceptions of particular situations. It is to address this situation that the Republic of Venezuela supports confidence- and security-building measures, particularly political and diplomatic measures, aimed at strengthening and supporting the culture of disarmament, peace, development and cooperation between States and their citizens.

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Item 67 (n) of the preliminary list*
General and complete disarmament: promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/59/50 and Corr.1.

04-41813 (E) 230704 260704

I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 8 of its resolution 58/44 of 8 December 2003, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the issue of the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and to submit a report containing that information to the Assembly at its fifty-ninth session.

2. Pursuant to that request, on 8 March 2004 a note verbale was sent to Member States inviting them to provide information on the subject. The replies received are reproduced in section II below. Additional replies received will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. Replies received from Governments

Guatemala

[Original: Spanish]
[8 June 2004]

1. The Army of Guatemala is aware of the decisive role played by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs in coordinating the collective efforts of all Member States to maintain international peace and security.

2. Furthermore, in reviewing each of the measures set out in General Assembly resolution 58/44, it is clear that the steps proposed are the best way at present to resolve conflicts between the countries of the Western hemisphere, and that at the same time they help to further all aspects of the maintenance of democracy, peace and security.

3. We share the view that the basis for achieving the proper degree of peace and security in the hemisphere is a common effort on the part of all countries, fully dedicated to justice, values, principles and legality that help individuals to develop in a climate of peace and tranquillity, as established in the domestic legislation of each Member State and as mandated by international law in that regard.

4. Topics such as multilateralism will have to be kept constantly under study by each of the Member Governments, and they must strive to translate them into specific activities to be evaluated and monitored by the Department for Disarmament Affairs under various programmes of work so that they can be conducted in the best possible way. That would obviously advance the maintenance of peace, coexistence, democracy and hence security in all the nations of the hemisphere.

5. Accordingly, the existing agreements on arms regulation and on orderly, effective disarmament ought to be put into practice, without at the same time departing from the domestic legislation of each Member State.

Honduras

[Original: Spanish]
[14 May 2004]

With reference to resolution 58/44, we concur with the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs as concerns the need to promote multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. Accordingly, Honduras supports the resolution, which, in line with the Charter of the United Nations, seeks to maintain peace and remove threats to the security of States, just as it supports what is stated in the Millennium Declaration regarding the promotion of economic and social development and the exercise of multilateralism as a way of managing threats to the security of States.

It should be emphasized that the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation is a matter of interest to the American hemisphere, as a means of minimizing the impact of the cold war legacy, which left a great many weapons lying about unsupervised. In addition, it promotes a scenario of peace, freedom, democracy and country development.

Insofar as Honduras is concerned, it is a participant, under the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America, in the arms reduction and arms control programme in Central America, which seeks to achieve a reasonable balance of forces and encourage stability, mutual trust and transparency.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[14 May 2004]

Lebanon is aware of the need for progress in arms regulation and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the basis of non-discriminatory and transparent negotiations, in view of the threat that these weapons pose to global stability. Lebanon rejects recourse to unilateral actions to solve security problems, affirms the principle of multilateralism as the basis for promoting negotiations with regard to arms regulation and disarmament, and urges the international community to hold relevant States accountable in case of non-compliance and to compel Israel, which possesses and is developing weapons of mass destruction, to cooperate in disarmament in order to safeguard peace and security in the region and confront the dangers that threaten it. It should be noted that Lebanon does not possess, produce or manufacture nuclear weapons, and is in favour of agreements mandating non-proliferation and non-production of nuclear weapons.

Mexico

[Original: Spanish]
[12 May 2004]

Mexico fully endorses resolution 58/44, for it considers it to be a very significant contribution to the international efforts to promote the strict observance of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially the principle of the sovereign equality of Member States.

For Mexico, it is obvious that in an era of growing globalization and an ongoing information and telecommunications revolution, the threats to international security and the problems surrounding disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation are of interest to each and every country in the world, particularly those who have been directly affected. For this reason, all States should have the possibility of participating in the negotiations that will decide what action must be taken to deal with such a global situation.

Multilateralism, in the view of the Government of Mexico, is the most effective path to the maintenance of international peace and security, especially through collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means the settlement of disputes.

Mexico also gives its full support to the structure of existing disarmament, arms-regulation and non-proliferation agreements offering the appropriate treaty-based infrastructure for further progress in those fields on the basis of universal, multilateral, non-discriminatory, binding and transparent negotiations.

Mexico urges all interested States to participate in negotiations on disarmament, arms-regulation and non-proliferation in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner, and it underlines the importance of preserving the United Nations disarmament machinery and the structure of existing disarmament agreements, which constitute a clear expression of the positive results of sound international cooperation and multilateral negotiations in response to the challenges facing the peoples of the entire world.

In Mexico's view, a resort to unilateral actions by Member States in resolving their security concerns, especially with regard to cases of non-compliance, seriously jeopardizes international peace and security and undermines confidence in the international security system as well as the very foundations of the United Nations. It is therefore essential for the States parties to the relevant disarmament, arms-regulation and non-proliferation instruments to consult one another and to cooperate as far as possible in resolving those concerns, refraining from resorting or threatening to resort to unilateral measures to settle them and from making unverified charges of non-compliance.

Mexico has always recognized the complementarity of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations in the fields of disarmament, arms regulation and non-proliferation. However, when faced with the emergence of initiatives taking a partial approach to the problems arising from the constant innovations and the development and production of and trafficking in materials and arms, especially weapons of mass destruction and highly sophisticated conventional weapons and their delivery systems, Mexico reaffirms multilateralism as the core principle in negotiations with a view to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Qatar

[Original: Arabic]
[22 April 2004]

Comments of the concerned authority in the State of Qatar on paragraphs 4 and 8 of General Assembly resolution 58/44:

(a) Regarding paragraph 4, we inform you that the State of Qatar has not taken any measures because it has no weapons requiring disarmament.

(b) Regarding paragraph 8, the State of Qatar wishes it to be known that it supports General Assembly resolution 58/44 entitled "Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation", adopted on 8 December 2003.

Venezuela

[Original: Spanish]
[18 May 2004]

The Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela believes that promoting and consolidating the multilateral disarmament system within the United Nations is basic to directing global policies with a view to establishing conditions of peace and security. In view of the new threats to international security, Venezuela is convinced of the need to acknowledge and strengthen the relevance both of the Disarmament Commission in particular and the First Committee in general.

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela expresses its deep concern that recently initiatives have been taken in the matter of disarmament and non-proliferation that have been developed in a context independent of the United Nations. Venezuela consequently considers it essential to affirm its support for any initiative that aims at achieving international peace and security, provided that it strengthens the multilateral disarmament system of the United Nations. The Government of Venezuela also views with concern the possibility that disarmament and non-proliferation questions might be transferred to the Security Council, given the recent Council resolution on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (resolution 1540 (2004)).

The State of Venezuela supports, cooperates in and carries out measures against the arms build-up and in favour of non-proliferation, yet it believes that any action taken in that regard must be conducted in accordance with international law and under the aegis of the United Nations. Using these criteria, Venezuela affirms its support for the United Nations multilateral disarmament system as the suitable forum for taking decisions of common interest and global reach.

Zambia

[Original: English]
[24 May 2004]

Zambia supports the efforts to promote multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. In this regard, it continues to reaffirm the absolute validity of disarmament aimed at resolving international conflict peacefully.

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Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/59/50 and Corr.1.

04-41824 (E) 260704

I. Introduction

1. On 8 December 2003, the General Assembly adopted resolution 58/45, entitled "Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control", in paragraph 4 of which the Assembly invited all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General information on the measures they have adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the resolution, and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report containing this information to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session.

2. Pursuant to that request, on 24 March 2004, a note verbale was sent to Member States inviting them to provide information on the subject. The replies received are reproduced in section II below. Additional replies received will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. Replies received from Governments

Guatemala

[Original: Spanish]
[8 June 2004]

The Guatemalan Army does not have any nuclear weapons and therefore it has no plans relating to nuclear disarmament. It is not engaged in any research in that area. That is the situation throughout Central America.

Honduras

[Original: Spanish]
[15 June 2004]

(a) Honduras does not have, nor has it ever had, any programme for the manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition of chemical or biological weapons;

(b) Honduras does have legal instruments for the control and management of its environmental policy; the latter provides for mechanisms for the protection of the environment;

(c) Honduras is currently a signatory to international treaties and conventions relating to protection of the environment;

(d) The Honduran Armed Forces base their military plans, operations and activities on the Government's environmental policy; moreover, they are working with the Government, through the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment, to preserve the stability and support the rehabilitation of the environment by developing projects to protect ecological reserves, fight fires, promote reforestation and take care of water supplies;

(e) The various economic development projects that the Republic of Honduras is currently undertaking are designed to protect and preserve the environment.

Mexico

[Original: Spanish]
[21 April 2004]

For Mexico, implementation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including the aim of maintenance of international peace and security by drawing up and implementing agreements on disarmament and arms control must be pursued in a manner consistent with applicable environmental norms, both customary and conventional.

One very important development in international law in recent decades has been the creation of norms for the protection of the environment. This system consists of primary rules pertaining to responsibility and mechanisms for the establishment of rules relating thereto and secondary rules which seek to establish the rights and obligations of States and other subjects of international law with respect to specific issues of concern to the international community with regard to the environment.

However, these norms should not be viewed in isolation, but in the context of the international law of which they form a part. The different areas of international law interact with one another since there are a variety of norms regulating the same acts. Accordingly, although there are no disarmament norms that prohibit weapons the use of which would have a negative impact on the environment, this does not mean that such weapons are permitted under international law. In order to come to a decision on the legality of their use, it is necessary to consider the obligations of States in the context of international law for the protection of the environment.

Mexico has always taken account of the interrelationship between norms and has therefore adopted a position in support of disarmament. It has stated in various forums that, given their destructive nature and the impact they have on all forms of life, weapons of mass destruction — particularly nuclear weapons — should be eradicated.

The importance of protecting the environment has given rise to an understanding of the need to start adopting laws to protect the environment in the context of different areas of international law. One clear example is the identification in international humanitarian law of norms to ensure environmental protection. Attention should be drawn to the advisory opinion concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons rendered by the International Court of Justice on 8 July 1996, whereby the Court, for the first time, made a specific pronouncement regarding the legal nature of certain obligations of environmental law and on their application with regard to possible situations of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The Court recognized that the environment, the physical space where biodiversity develops and that determines the quality of life and health of present and future generations is under daily threat and affirmed that the use of nuclear weapons could produce an environmental catastrophe. Accordingly, States had a general unassailable legal obligation which was generally accepted by the international community and stated in a number of international instruments, including in the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations. That obligation was intimately related to the effects of weapons of mass destruction, which could

potentially be catastrophic not only for our generation or the next but also for future generations.

It should be noted that the Court reiterated as a general customary norm of international environmental law, the principle of good neighbourliness, whereby all States had an obligation to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control did not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (this principle with slight variations thereof has been established in the Declaration on the Human Environment, adopted in Stockholm in 1972, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) and the *Trail Smelter* and *Lake Lanoux* arbitral awards). Mexico agrees with the Court that this general norm is applicable to disarmament and arms control agreements, since the use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, would have uncontrollable effects that could not be restricted in space or in time and that by their very nature might have an adverse impact on the space and property of another State.

Although the Court was of the view that the provisions of treaties on international environmental law did not prevent States from exercising their right to self-defence, it did establish that States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what was a necessary and proportionate response in the event of an armed attack. It also pointed out that articles 35, paragraph 3, and 55 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) provided additional protection for the environment during armed conflicts.

Because of the special characteristics of the conventional rules governing international environmental law — whose ultimate aim, like those governing human rights law, is to safeguard the interests of humanity and not merely that of particular States and the fact that violation would have a direct impart on the lifestyle of members of present and future generations, violation of an environmental treaty does not open the possibility of applying article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which establishes that breach of a treaty may be grounds for terminating the treaty. It is therefore important to point out the violation of a conventional norm by one belligerent State cannot be invoked by the other State as a ground for violating these environmental provisions.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court also establishes a close link between international environmental law and international humanitarian law for article 8 thereof defines intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated as a war crime.

From the foregoing analysis Mexico has concluded that, even taking into account the fact that international environmental law does not establish specific norms with regard to disarmament and arms control, it does, by its very nature, place important limits on the use of certain types of weapons and therefore must be taken into account in the negotiation of norms for disarmament and arms control. Mexico believes that the duties of States in respect of international environmental law are designed, by their very nature, to prohibit any type of arms that would cause significant damage to the environment.

By way of an example of the respect that it has for the general environmental norms in disarmament and arms control agreements, on 29 March 2004, Mexico signed an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with IAEA, in keeping with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). It did so knowing that this expression of a legal link reaffirms its commitment to nuclear disarmament and in full knowledge of the fact that this will contribute to prevention of any harmful effect to the environment stemming from lack of protection and safety measures in nuclear activities, materials and facilities.

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Fifty-ninth session
Item 72 of the preliminary list*
Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region

Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/59/50 and Corr.1.

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I. Introduction

1. On 8 December 2003, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 58/70, entitled "Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region", by which, inter alia, it called upon all States of the Mediterranean region that had not yet done so to adhere to all the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, thus creating the necessary conditions for strengthening peace and cooperation in the region, and encouraged all States of the region to favour the necessary conditions for strengthening the confidence-building measures among them by promoting genuine openness and transparency on all military matters, by participating, inter alia, in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and by providing accurate data and information to the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms. The Assembly also encouraged the Mediterranean countries to strengthen further their cooperation in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, and in combating international crime and illicit arms transfers and illicit drug production, consumption and trafficking, which pose a serious threat to peace, security and stability in the region and therefore to the improvement of the current political, economic and social situation and which jeopardize friendly relations among States, hinder the development of international cooperation and result in the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic basis of pluralistic society. Furthermore, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on means to strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region.

2. In this connection, a note verbale dated 18 February 2004 was sent to States and relevant intergovernmental organizations. The replies received are reproduced in section II below. Any replies received subsequently will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. Replies received from States

A. Jordan

[Original: English]
[10 May 2004]

3. The Mission wishes to reiterate that Jordan's policy on the subject matter in question is one that underscores the importance of calling for the consistent consolidation and strengthening of confidence-building measures and emphasizing the need to solidify and further strengthen peace and security on both the regional and international levels. Jordan places special importance on creating a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East and has signed all relevant international instruments concerning arms control and non-proliferation.

4. Additionally, Jordan has been actively participating in a broad range of conferences and workshops aimed at devising effective means and measures to curb terrorism and bring terrorists to justice and combat illicit trading and trafficking in weapons and drugs. The General Headquarters of the Jordanian Armed Forces regularly, and on an annual basis, submits a transparent report detailing all facets of

its military expenditure and its full inventory of weapons and armament to the relevant United Nations organs.

B. Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[25 May 2004]

5. Regarding the request that all the States of the Middle East region become parties to all multilateral legal instruments on disarmament, Lebanon has signed or ratified a number of those instruments, the most important of which are:

(a) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed by Lebanon on 1 July 1968 and ratified on 15 July 1970;

(b) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed by Lebanon on 10 April 1972 and ratified on 26 March 1975;

(c) The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, signed by Lebanon on 18 May 1977 and not yet ratified.

6. Lebanon is committed to a policy of maintaining international peace and security. For that reason, it undertook to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1970 and has ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Lebanon believes in the need to make the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and in the illegality of the threat of use of such weapons. Strengthening security in the Middle East region requires efforts by all parties concerned. However, it is a known fact that Israel is the sole nuclear-weapon State in the Middle East and is recognized by the United Nations as possessing nuclear warheads, yet refuses to allow monitoring of its nuclear arsenal by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

7. Regarding counter-terrorism, Lebanon has taken a firm stand against terrorism in all its forms, including State terrorism, and fully supports Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). Lebanon has submitted its third report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to that resolution, concerning counter-terrorism, and is currently preparing its fourth report.

8. Lebanon has acceded to 10 international conventions on terrorism and is at present studying the possibility of acceding to the two conventions to which it is not yet a party, namely:

(a) The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (12 January 1998);

(b) The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (9 December 1999).

9. Lebanon believes that the exercise of the right of peoples to resist occupation with a view to self-determination in accordance with the four Geneva Conventions does not constitute terrorism. It also believes that the killing of innocent civilians by

the authorities of an occupying State constitutes an act of State terrorism and is to be condemned.

C. Mexico

[Original: Spanish]
[6 May 2004]

10. Mexico reaffirms that security in the Mediterranean region is closely linked to security in Europe and to international peace and security. In that context, it urges States in the Mediterranean region to promote developments in the area of political cooperation and security that will favour the strengthening of the peace process and emphasizes that the Barcelona Declaration, adopted in 1995 as the basis for the Euro-Mediterranean process, designated political cooperation and security as one of the three pillars of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

11. Mexico echoes the call, contained in paragraph 5 of resolution 58/70, to the effect that all States of the Mediterranean region that have not yet done so should adhere to all the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, thus creating the necessary conditions for strengthening peace and cooperation in the region. It calls on those States to step up their efforts to reach an agreement that will ensure peace and stability in the region.

D. Morocco

[Original: French]
[7 May 2004]

12. Morocco has always believed that peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean should be a strategic objective to be achieved and a common good to be promoted and strengthened.

13. The Mediterranean faces security challenges which are as varied as they are numerous. In addition to often chronic conflicts, whether open or latent, and the heightened effects of certain global social phenomena, the Mediterranean is feeling the full effects of new, widespread and violent threats, such as terrorism. Those challenges are not of course specific to the region but, when combined with other regional factors, they are exacerbated and take on added importance.

14. More specifically, the development gaps between an integrated and prosperous Europe and a southern flank, which is still developing, highlight the social and economic problems facing the two sides. The economic disparities between the two sides of the Mediterranean speak volumes: annual per capita income is $20,000 in the European Union countries but only $2,000 in the Maghreb and the Middle East. That economic gap between North and South in the Mediterranean region gives rise to and accentuates such troubling phenomena as illicit trafficking and illegal migration, a situation which fuels tensions in the Mediterranean subregions.

15. International terrorism has unquestionably acquired a global dimension. That phenomenon has not spared the Mediterranean, as evidenced by the attacks in Djerba, Casablanca, Istanbul and Madrid. The fight against this insidious and unpredictable threat which has challenged the world order requires collaborative

efforts through a comprehensive and concerted approach to eradicating its various root causes and manifestations.

16. The lack of progress towards disarmament at the international and regional levels, together with the refusal of some countries to accede to multilateral non-proliferation conventions, has the potential to affect the climate of confidence and exacerbate the arms race in the region.

17. Moreover, the protracted crises which have become almost chronic cannot help but affect security in the region. In that regard, the Middle East conflict continues to escalate, in spite of initiatives on the part of the international community and mediation efforts; it poses a serious threat to the Mediterranean identity and is a powder keg which threatens the stability of the Mediterranean.

18. Other challenges of an environmental nature, such as water shortages and excessive demand on water resources in many areas of the Mediterranean, could increase tension in the region.

19. Given the growing challenges to peace and security in the Mediterranean and the benefits derived from a policy of openness founded on dialogue, shared management of regional issues and acts of solidarity, Morocco has, since the end of the 1980s, contributed to various initiatives aimed at the promotion of real cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

20. In that context, Morocco's cooperation with the Mediterranean countries has been a singularly positive one, because the Kingdom prepared the way for or initiated a number of measures aimed at restructuring the Mediterranean strategic space and strengthening dialogue and cooperation between the two sides. Morocco has always sought to enrich the conceptual framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations, adapt their institutional mechanisms and improve the operational effectiveness of Mediterranean regional consultation and cooperation structures.

21. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona process) in particular, which is the most comprehensive and multidimensional initiative in that it deals with security in the Mediterranean in its various economic, political, cultural and social dimensions, is a fine example of such efforts.

22. The regional framework is complemented by profuse and varied bilateral relationships between Morocco and the European Union. The longstanding, dense, robust and multidimensional nature of relations between Morocco and Europe has led the two parties to give their relations the advanced integration status requested by Morocco, which is perfectly in keeping with the European Union's new European Neighbourhood policy.

23. The Mediterranean Forum, the 5+5 Dialogue and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation initiative reinforce and complement in a useful and relevant manner the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

24. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Mediterranean Dialogue, in which Morocco has participated since it was launched in 1994, provides an important framework for political consultation, a satisfactory tool for practical cooperation and an essential conduit for information exchange. Morocco has also contributed to the Alliance's efforts to stabilize the Balkans in the context of the Kosovo Force

(KFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) missions, in which the Kingdom is participating pursuant to United Nations resolutions.

25. Thanks to the growing number of cooperation and consultation mechanisms established with a view to promoting cooperation for security in the Mediterranean, there is a true sense of shared purpose, which should be accompanied by efforts to make optimal use of resources and methods. Although the existence of such structures makes a positive contribution to regional security, their actions must be coordinated in order to avoid duplication and to develop synergies capable of reinforcing stability in the Mediterranean.

26. Furthermore, the key to the establishment of a Mediterranean regional order founded on a truly balanced partnership is improving the sense of ownership of the countries on the southern shore with regard to those various structures and initiatives.

27. Morocco has always believed that the shared nature of security requires the adoption of a comprehensive and concerted approach capable of ensuring peace and security in the region and of transforming it into a region of mutual prosperity, based on active cooperation and joint responsibility between Europe and the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

28. The concept of the indivisibility of security now calls for the circle of Euro-Mediterranean solidarity to be widened to include other neighbouring regions, particularly Africa.

29. The Kingdom of Morocco believes that the closing of the social and economic development gap and the establishment of confidence-building measures between the countries of the region should serve as a catalyst for the emergence of a stable and prosperous regional order which will progress from security based solely on the concept of vigilance towards truly integrated security for the benefit of all the peoples of the region.

30. It nevertheless remains true that only real political will on the part of the States of the region can contribute to overcoming the stereotype of the Mediterranean as an area of crisis and restore it to its original role as a zone of peace and economic, human and cultural exchanges.

E. Panama

[Original: Spanish]
[24 May 2004]

31. The following information was provided by the Council for Public Security and National Defence of the Office of the President of the Republic of Panama.

32. The Republic of Panama supports any initiative, whether bilateral or multilateral, that would provide greater guarantees against threats to international peace and security and would therefore contribute to enhancing peace and cooperation in the region.

33. In this connection, Panama deems it important to favour the necessary conditions for strengthening mutual confidence-building measures among States. In

particular, it believes that participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms would contribute to stability in the region.

34. Lastly, Panama believes that the Mediterranean countries should be encouraged to continue their cooperation in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and in combating international crime, illicit arms trafficking and illicit drug production, consumption and trafficking, which diminish the quality of life of their peoples and pose a serious threat to peace and stability in the region. To this end, the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, as well as various multilateral agreements in a number of fields must be taken into account.

35. The Republic of Panama is convinced that such measures will build confidence and reduce the perceived threat in the region. It therefore looks forward to the achievement of significant progress on issues underlying the conflict itself, as well as better communication among countries traditionally thought to be adversaries.

F. Venezuela

[Original: Spanish]
[18 May 2004]

36. The Government of Venezuela considers paragraphs 5 to 8 of the said resolution to be in conformity with its traditional approach to foreign policy in that they reaffirm the national ideal of peace and security as global values and are in keeping with the international instruments negotiated under the United Nations multilateral system, designed to create a lawful and reliable framework for action.

A/59/131

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Fifty-ninth session
Item 16 of the preliminary list*
Elections to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other elections

Election of seven members of the Committee for Programme and Coordination

Note by the Secretary-General

1. In accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 2008 (LX) of 14 May 1976 and General Assembly decision 42/450 of 17 December 1987, the members of the Committee for Programme and Coordination are nominated by the Economic and Social Council and elected by the General Assembly.

2. The membership of the Committee in 2004 is as follows:

Argentina,** Armenia,** Bahamas,*** Benin,** Brazil,** Canada,** Central African Republic,** China,* Comoros,*** Cuba,** Ethiopia,* France,*** Gabon,** Germany,** India,** Indonesia,** Iran (Islamic Republic of),** Japan,* Mexico,*** Monaco,** Nicaragua,** Nigeria,* Pakistan,** Republic of Korea,* Republic of Moldova,** Russian Federation,*** South Africa,** Switzerland,** Tunisia,* Ukraine,** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,** United States of America,*** Uruguay* and Zimbabwe.***

* Term of office expires on 31 December 2004.

** Term of office expires on 31 December 2005.

*** Term of office expires on 31 December 2006.

3. The General Assembly, at its fifty-ninth session, will be called upon to elect seven members, on the nomination of the Economic and Social Council, to fill the vacancies in the Committee that will occur on 31 December 2004 upon the expiration of the terms of office of the following members: China, Ethiopia, Japan, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Tunisia and Uruguay.

* A/59/50 and Corr.1.

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4. In accordance with General Assembly decision 42/450, the vacancies are to be filled as follows:

(a) Three members from African States;

(b) Three members from Asian States;

(c) One member from Latin American and Caribbean States.

5. By its decisions 2004/201 C of 4 May 2004 and 2004/201 D of 23 June 2004, the Economic and Social Council nominated the following Member States for election by the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session for a term of three years beginning on 1 January 2005: Algeria, China, Ghana, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya and Republic of Korea. The geographical distribution of the nominated Member States is as follows:

(a) African States (three vacancies): Algeria, Ghana, Kenya;

(b) Asian States (three vacancies): China, Japan, Republic of Korea;

(c) Latin American and Caribbean States (one vacancy): Jamaica.